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When someone visits a web site, the site's server uses input from the person's web 
browser to dynamically generate the webpage returned to the user.  If hackers can 
find a weakness in the site's code and control how webpages are generated, they 
can insert their own scripts into the webpage returned to visitors.  These scripts 
run in the visitor's browser and can compromise the visitor's personal information.  
The injection of scripts into a webpage by means of evading input filtering is 
called a cross-site scripting (XSS) attack.  Even popular websites, such as Google, 
Facebook, and YouTube, have been exploited by XSS attacks (KF & DP, 2012).  
In 2010, XSS attacks were ranked the 2nd-leading source of web security risk 
(OWASP, 2010). 
XSS attacks, by their very nature, are not detectable client-side (e.g., by web 
browsers or antivirus programs). Current methods to prevent XSS exploits are 
either ineffective (allowing some attacks to succeed) or overly prohibitive 
(preventing legitimate HTML-rich content).  This project describes a new 
approach: The structure of safe input is rigorously defined and a server-side tool 
is implemented to detect the presence of a potential XSS attack.  This tool 
prevents XSS attacks while still permitting HTML-rich content.  We define a new 
context-free grammar (Script-Free HTML 4) that precisely characterizes safe 
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input.  Our approach is evaluated by applying it to a benchmark of known XSS 
vulnerabilities.  We also consider the future evolution of this approach in the ever-
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1.1 Background and Motivation 
It is no secret that our lives are intertwined with the Internet.  Among many other 
things, we use the internet to look up directions, talk with friends and family, buy 
books, do our banking, and collaborate with co-workers.  The internet has not 
only increased convenience in our lives, but has also made possible the otherwise 
impossible.  Just like in person, we have to communicate information to make 
these things happen.  Examples of such information include our addresses, the 
identity of our friends, the conversations we have, our credit card numbers, our 
usernames and passwords, and our confidential work files.  To take advantage of 
the convenience the internet offers, however, we must transfer our sensitive 
information over the internet. 
Although legitimate websites attempt to safeguard our information, black-hat 
hackers actively seek to bypass those safeguards and steal our information for 
personal gain.  For instance, one might steal your name, address, credit card 
number, and social security number to steal your identity and money.  Black-hat 
hackers use a variety of tools and tricks to help them steal your sensitive 
information.  For example, some hackers will find your username, which tends to 
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be publically available, and attempt to guess every password you could possibly 
have.  This method, called a brute force attack, may sound slow and tedious, but 
hackers have computer programs do all the guessing for them, and can guess 
thousands of passwords per second.  Some hackers will make a website that 
imitates another website.  They will then try to trick you into logging into their 
website as if it were the original, giving them your username and password.  This 
particular example is called a phishing scheme, while the setup that lures you to 
the website is called social engineering (OWASP, 2012).  Some attackers take 
advantage of flaws in code itself.  Although finding flaws in code, or 
vulnerabilities, may be more difficult to do, such an attack does not require any of 
your information or for you to do anything out of regular behavior.  In September 
2012, a zero-day exploit in recent versions of Internet Explorer gave hackers full 
access to peoples' computers (Oremus, 2012).  Similarly, some hackers exploit 
website code.  All it took to become infected with the Sammy MySpace worm 
was to visit an infected webpage (Kotadia, 2005). 
When you visit a website, your browser requests a webpage from the remote web 
server.  The server takes this request, does some computing work, and responds 
by sending a file containing code detailing what to display on the page and what 
to do if you interact with the page.  The code detailing how to make the page is 
called a markup language, commonly HyperText Markup Language (HTML), and 
the code detailing how to react to your actions is called a script, commonly 
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JavaScript.  Sometimes, the HTML you get back will produce a page displaying 
information you supplied.  For example, if you run a Google search that yields no 
results, Google will print your search terms back to you.  To display that text, the 
server copies your input into your response HTML. 
Hackers exploit response HTML by giving websites input that, when read by a 
web browser, executes malicious scripts.  This form of attack is called an XSS 
attack, and the malicious input they create is called an attack vector (Shar & Tan, 
2012).  The primary obstacle for an attack vector is input-checking code on the 
web server.  If hackers can find a weakness in the server code so their input will 
execute on your web browser, they can manipulate your web browser into doing 
their bidding.  For instance, you can fall victim to an XSS attack simply by 
following a URL containing an attack vector.  Forums and wikis consist almost 
entirely of user input.  Thus, you can also fall victim to an XSS attack simply by 
loading a web page containing an attack vector.   
In 2010, OWASP ranked XSS attacks 2nd in their top 10 "Most Critical Web 
Application Security Risks" (OWASP, 2010).  In 2011, Mitre ranked XSS attacks 
4th in their top 25 "Most Dangerous Software Errors" (Mitre, 2011).  Because this 
attack method can affect anyone that browses the internet, the solution to this 
problem benefits, among many other people, anyone who uses online banking 




To address the problem of XSS attacks, we develop: a context-free grammar, 
called SFH4, which produces a language that follows the structure of HTML and 
is free from JavaScript invocations; a parser for SFH4; and a methodology for 
generating a context-free grammar and parser from a Document-Type Definition 
(DTD). 
SFH4 determines if input is safe or unsafe on the basis of the input's structure and 
scripting content.  For instance, if a user inputs well-formed HTML 4 with no 
signs of possible script invocations, the parser accepts it as safe.  Conversely, if a 
user inputs malformed HTML 4 or content which follows a pattern known to risk 
browser script invocation, the parser rejects it as potentially unsafe.  Thus, the 
parser is sound but imprecise; it only accepts safe input, but also rejects input 
which may, in practice, be safe.  Web applications can use an SFH4 parser to test 
the safety of raw or filtered user input before embedding it in returned HTML. 
1.3 Thesis Outline 
Chapter 2.1 defines XSS attacks and discusses how they work.  Chapter 2.2 
presents existing methods for preventing XSS attacks, while chapter 2.3 discusses 
each method's strengths and weaknesses to explain where these methods excel 
and where issues remain. 
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Chapter 3.1 contains an in-depth summary of the project's solution, which is to 
use a Script-Free HTML 4 (SFH4) parser on the web server to detect unsafe user 
input, while chapter 3.2 discusses the process used to implement the SFH4 parser.  
Chapter 4.1 discusses the findings of designing and implementing SFH4 and its 




2.0 Literature Review 
2.1 Problem Analysis 
To research the overview of and current methods of handling XSS attacks, we 
reference an article in the magazine COMPUTER (Shar & Tan, 2012), papers on 
code injection and XSS (Bisht & Venkatakrishnan, 2008) (Ligatti & Ray, 2012), 
and material published by The Open Web Application Security Project (OWASP, 
2012). 
Ligatti and Ray define code-injection attacks as attacks in which an attacker's 
input is used as code (Ligatti & Ray, 2012).  Shar and Tan define XSS attacks as 
attacks in which web browsers treat a malicious user's input, also known as an 
attack vector, as scripting content (Shar & Tan, 2012).  As these definitions 
demonstrate, the identification and prevention of XSS attacks requires two things: 
an understanding of when user input may be interpreted as browser scripts and 
how attackers bypass preventative measures to inject scripting content into pages 
served to others. 
Based on the HTML 4.01 Strict DTD, browsers should only invoke scripts in 
script elements and event attributes (Hors, Jacobs, & Raggett, 1999).  For an 




<a href="about:blank" onhover="alert('event 
attribute');">Hover over me!</a> 
Figure 1: Script Invocations 
As highlighted by Bisht and Venkatakrishnan, however, browser quirks introduce 
major difficulty and uncertainty in identifying potential scripting content (Bisht & 
Venkatakrishnan, 2008).  For example, some versions of Internet Explorer invoke 
JavaScript when "javascript:" starts the IMG element's src attribute.  For an 
example of such an element, see Figure 2. 
<img src="javascript:alert('browser quirk')"> 
Figure 2: Browser Quirk 
Additionally, embedded content, such as Cascading Style Sheets (CSS) and Flash 
files, can contain browser-side scripting content and is impossible to detect 
without also scanning the embedded content (OWASP, 2013).  Thus, to prevent 
scripting invocations based on only a web page's source HTML, it becomes 
necessary to prevent input from becoming involved with script elements, event 
attributes, and content embedding. 
As demonstrated by OWASP's filter evasion cheat sheet examples (made by 
RSnake), the key to an attack vector's success is its ability to open and close 
elements and its ability to start and end attributes.  To introduce scripting content, 
an attack vector commonly must close the element or end the attribute in which it 
is originally used and open a new element or start a new attribute (OWASP, 
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2013).  With no restraints, this task is trivial for an attack vector; to end an 
attribute, an attack vector needs only to include a quotation mark, and to close an 
element, an attack vector needs only to include the element's closing tag.  As a 
result, unchecked input leaves a site completely vulnerable to XSS attacks.  For 
an example of an attack vector which demonstrates an attempt to end attributes 







Figure 3: Attack Vector 
However, the more restrained the input, the fewer ways the input may be used 
legitimately.  For instance, successfully forcing each character of user input to be 
printed by the web browser prevents user input from being used to format text or 
create page structure.  Such features may be useful on wikis, blogs, and forum 
posts. 
2.2 Prevention Methods 
Shar and Tan highlight 3 simple, yet popular and effective, methods for 
preventing XSS attacks: blacklisting, whitelisting, and escaping characters.  
Blacklists describe unsafe input that should be rejected when encountered.  
Typically, web applications blacklist attack vectors by describing them with 
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regular expressions and scanning input strings for matches.  When the application 
encounters a match, the application typically either removes the matched 
substring or rejects the entire input string.  Whitelists, on the other hand, define 
safe input; web applications reject input that does not match values in its whitelist.  
Escaping characters replaces all HTML meta-characters in user input with their 
HTML-encoded equivalents.  That is, any character in user input which would 
normally have special meaning is replaced with text which instructs web browsers 
to display the character rather than interpret it as page structure (Shar & Tan, 
2012). 
XSS-Guard generates a webpage twice, once with user input and once with safe 
input following the same path through code.  Using a parser based on FireFox's 
content sink, XSS-Guard generates a JavaScript parse tree for each page and 
compares the parse trees.  If XSS-Guard finds that the parse trees are syntactically 
equivalent, XSS-Guard considers the generated output safe and does nothing; 
otherwise it alters the scripting content sent to the user, replacing what it identifies 
as malicious scripting content with a benign counterpart.  Thus, XSS-Guard uses 
the actual scripting content generated to determine safeness rather than making 




HTML Purifier takes an approach similar to that of SFH4; it uses the structure of 
HTML and a whitelist of HTML elements and attributes to maintain a description 
of safe input.  The application parses input into tokens, alters and validates input 
according to its settings, and converts the resulting tokens back into a string for 
use by the web application.  HTML Purifier intends for web applications to take 
user input, pass the user input through HTML Purifier, and embed the returned 
text straight into the output page (Yang, 2012). 
2.3 Analysis of Methods 
Due to their simplicity, blacklists, whitelists, and character escaping are all 
efficient to use and easy to apply.  However, as Shar and Tan indicated, they are 
flawed.  Blacklists tend to fail to catch all attack vectors, whitelists prohibit much 
valid input, and character escaping prevents use of HTML-rich input (Shar & Tan, 
2012).  In addition, “successful” use of these methods typically means exclusively 
printing user input, not using it for any form of page structure.  As a result, web 
developers may not be able to use these methods to permit users to complexly 
format their own content or build their own pages. 
XSS-Guard more effectively detects scripting content due to its high-level 
approach, but at the cost of generating and comparing two JavaScript parse trees 
and correcting output to make it safe.  Additionally, XSS-Guard fails when web 
applications use conditional copying, such as when one string is copied character 
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by character to another string.  XSS-Guard also fails when an exploit is 
“embedded in a Flash object included by the web application” (Bisht & 
Venkatakrishnan, 2008). 
HTML Purifier shares many of its strengths with SFH4 due to their similar 
approaches.  For instance, enforcing a strict HTML structure and an element and 
attribute whitelist effectively stops most risky user input.  However, HTML 
Purifier's behavior is difficult to reason about due to its editable whitelist and lack 
of clear detection and editing definitions.  Additionally, HTML Purifier doesn't 
sanitize input based on the context in which the input will be used, potentially 
leading to unsafe use of “safe” input, an issue discussed by Ligatti and Ray. 
2.4 Related Work 
SQL injection attacks are a web application security problem similar to XSS 
attacks.  In an SQL injection attack, an attacker sends an input string to a web 
application with the intent of the web application executing the string as code in 
an SQL statement rather than as a literal value (Su & Wassermann, 2006).  As a 
result of SQL injection attacks, attackers may steal information from the website 
(such as obtaining account details and login credentials) or remove information 




An approach to detect and prevent these attacks at run-time is to create and 
compare SQL query parse trees (Buehrer, Weide, & Sivilotti, 2005).  A parse tree 
represents the structure of an SQL statement, where leaves of the tree represent 
specific tokens (keywords, identifiers, and literals) and nodes of the tree represent 
groups of tokens.  Assuming web applications always intend for user input to be a 
proper subtree in an SQL parse tree, the parse tree generated as the result of an 
SQL injection attack necessarily will not match that of the parse tree generated by 
the SQL query intended by the web application. 
To apply a similar approach to the prevention of XSS attacks, we would compare 
JavaScript parse trees rather than SQL parse trees.  However, webpages sent to 
visitors consists of HTML, which can invoke JavaScript.  Thus, we can't work 
with pure JavaScript and must work with HTML parse trees instead.  Then our 
task becomes determining what subtrees of any HTML parse tree invoke 
JavaScript, and when the HTML parse tree of user input contains a subtree that 
invokes JavaScript.  Thus, we can see that this approach helps us gain insight on 
how to detect XSS attacks, but cannot be applied directly to prevent it.  If we 
color the parts of an HTML parse tree which invoke JavaScript, our task is to 
restrict user input to uncolored proper subtrees of an HTML parse tree. 
An approach to detect SQL injection vulnerabilities before run-time is to first 
describe all the strings used in SQL queries that may be influenced by user input 
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run through server code, then determining if the resulting grammar can generate 
an SQL injection attack (Wassermann & Su, 2007).  In their implementation, 
Wassermann and Su use context-free grammar rules to describe the changes a 
string may undergo by PHP operations and methods.  Once the grammar for the 
given code is generated, they test if the grammar can produce a syntactically open 
statement, such as if a query string can contain an odd number of un-escaped 
quotation marks. 
The overall goal of this approach is to prevent attacks by detecting when user 
input can result in syntactically open strings.  While we could use such an 
approach to prevent user input from manipulating HTML elements and attributes, 
and thus prevent many XSS attacks, it would prevent user input from being used 
to style text and structure pages.  We do see, however, that use of context-free 
grammars can help us reason about what a page with user-influenced input may 




3.1 Solution Overview 
To bypass filters and invoke browser-side scripts, most successful attack vectors 
use a combination of: malformed HTML, particular HTML elements and 
attributes, and browser quirks.  We prevent XSS attacks by restricting user input 
to well-formed HTML consisting of white-listed HTML elements and attributes.  
We captures this description by defining a context-free grammar, called SFH4, 
and implementing a parser for it through the use of the HTML 4.01 Strict DTD 
(Hors, Jacobs, & Raggett, 1999) and GNU's Flex (The Flex Project, 2008) and 
Bison (Free Software Foundation, Inc., 2008) programs.  The resulting parser 
accepts ASCII text as input and returns true if and only if the input is a member of 
SFH4. 
To use the SFH4 parser, a web application must do two things.  Firstly, the 
application must construct a test web page using the user's input and mimicking 
its use in the actual webpage.  For instance, if an application intends to embed 
user input inside an HTML "div" element, the application must first create a test 
page which starts with the content in Figure 4, followed by the user content, and 
ending with the content in Figure 5.  The only important surrounding information 
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for generating the test page is the HTML structure surrounding the user input; 
other elements and character data are not important. 
<!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC  
"-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.01 Transitional//EN"> 
<html><body><div> 
Figure 4: Test Page Prefix 
</div></body></html> 
Figure 5: Test Page Suffix 
Secondly, the application must pass the test page to the parser.  If the parser 
rejects the test page, then the web application should handle the user input as if it 
is unsafe to use as the application intended.  Otherwise, the application may use 
the user input as it intended.  The parser may reject input that is in fact safe, but 
further processing would be necessary to determine whether or not the input is, in 
fact, safe.  Whether or not such input really is safe or not may vary from browser 
to browser, as well, due to browsers responding differently to the same web 
pages, particularly those with non-standard structure. 
A server using the parser executable will need to locate and set permissions on the 
executable such that the parser is reachable and executable by the web 
application.  The web application can then call the executable, redirecting stdin to 
a file containing the test page to be parsed.  If the program exits with status 0, 
then the parser considers the test page safe.  Otherwise, the parser considers the 
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test page unsafe.  Because the parser uses a file for input, multi-threaded use of 
the parser requires use of multiple files as potential input buffers. 
3.2 Implementation Process 
For our implementation, we used the HTML 4.01 Strict DTD as input, mIRC 
Scripting Language (MSL) from mIRC v7.17 for generating token and grammar 
definitions, GNU Bison v2.4.1 and GNU Flex v2.5.4 to generate the C code for 
the parser, and Gnu C Compiler (gcc) v4.6.1 to compile the parser code.  To 
summarize the process before going into detail, we take a Document Type 
Definition (DTD) as input, and in steps 1 and 2 parse the DTD to create a 
whitelist of permitted elements and attributes.  In step 3, we alter the whitelist of 
elements and attributes to exclude the elements and attributes we deem unsafe.  In 
step 4, we generate the grammar using the whitelist of elements and attributes and 
a pre-written definition of tokens.  In the remaining steps, the Bison and Flex 
applications generate C code for the parser using our grammar definition, and gcc 
compiles the C code into the final executable. 
Firstly, an MSL script (parseItems) parses the DTD for element, attribute, and 
entity definitions.  Secondly, more MSL scripts (evaluateEntities, 
evaluateElements, evaluateAttributes) evaluate the definitions and 
parse them into two lists: a list of elements and their permitted sub elements, as 
well as a list of elements and their attribute declarations. 
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In the third step, another MSL script (removeItems) modifies the two lists to 
remove unsafe elements and attributes and restrict the values of attributes with 
known browser quirks.  Rather than removing elements and attributes from the 
parsed data, we could have removed element and attribute definitions from the 
DTD before passing the DTD to the parsing process.  For a diagram of steps 1-3, 
see Figure 6. 
 
Figure 6: Parsing and Modifying 
With exceptions from browser quirks, attack vectors invoke JavaScript with 
unsafe attributes, not particular values within otherwise safe attributes.  As such, 
we default the value type of all attributes to “PCDATA,” and make special 
exceptions for known browser quirks.  By defaulting value types to PCDATA, we 
are able to make the language less complex and reduce the manual intervention 
necessary for the process workflow to complete. 
In the fourth step, another MSL script (makeInputFiles) reads the parsed 
data and manually created configuration files to generate the token and grammar 
definitions.  For a diagram of this step, see Figure 7.  For the complete set of MSL 








Figure 7: Definition Generation 
To generate the token definitions, the MSL script reads from a configuration file 
including pattern definitions, match-handling, and procedures written in C.  For 
the scanner configuration file, see Appendix A.  Basic pattern definitions, such as 
SYMBOL, NUM, and ALPHA, are used to make more complex patterns, such as 
PCDATA and URI.  The match-handling rules consist of patterns and C code and 
dictate how the Flex-generated scanner should respond to characters from its 
input stream to determine a token type to return.  In our parser, the rules instruct 
the scanner to ignore white space and to always treat the greater than and less than 
symbols as tokens. 
Global variables _inOpenTag and _inQuote are checked and updated with 












value before deciding what token type to return.  The procedures in the 
configuration file include printDebug, upperString, and parseID.   
printDebug outputs the text received and its token type, and upperString 
converts input text to uppercase.  MSL procedurally generates the function 
parseID, which checks ID values for white-listed element and attribute names.  
For an abbreviated copy of the Flex input generated in this step, see Appendix B. 
To generate the grammar definition, the MSL script reads two configuration files 
containing token definitions, method prototypes, a start rewrite rule, and C 
methods required by Bison.  For the grammar configuration files, see Appendix 
A.  Manually defined tokens include PCDATA, URI, ERROR, and DOCTYPE.  
Because our pipeline does not make any guarantees regarding the order in which 
it produces SFH4 rewrite rules, the configuration files contains a start rule to 
ensure a correct starting rule. 
Bison requires three C methods for it to function: yylex, yyerror, and main.  
yylex is implemented by Flex, so the configuration file only includes a 
prototype of the method.  main and yyerror, on the other hand, are completely 
defined in the configuration files. 
The MSL script procedurally generates ID token declarations and all SFH4 
rewrite rules.  For each HTML element, MSL generates a starting rewrite rule, a 
sub-element rewrite rule, and an attributes rewrite rule.  The starting rule includes 
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the start tag of the element, attributes inside its open tag, sub-elements after its 
open tag, and a close tag after its sub-elements.  In the case where an element has 
no sub elements, the sub-elements and close tag are omitted.  The sub-elements 
rewrite rule rewrites to any number of any of the elements permitted between the 
element's open and close tags, including PCDATA.  The attributes rewrite rule 
rewrites to any number of any of the attributes permitted inside the element.  For 
an abbreviated copy of the grammar definition, see Appendix D. 
Next, in the fifth step, the process passes the token and grammar definitions to 
Flex and Bison, generating C code.  Finally, the process compiles the C code with 
gcc to create the parser executable.  For diagrams of these final steps, see Figure 8 
and Figure 9. 
 











Figure 9: Code Compilation 
Parser 
Executable 





Upon analyzing common attack vectors, we found that most attack vectors could 
be generalized to a few patterns.  In general, attack vectors: violate HTML 
structure, embed foreign content, invoke scripts in CSS, or exploit browser quirks.  
Enforcing a strict HTML structure handles the case of poor input structure 
breaking surrounding HTML, and enforcing an element and attribute whitelist 
handles the cases of embedded foreign content and scripts invoked in CSS.  
Because browser quirks are prone to vary by version and brand of web browser, 
however, not only are browser quirks difficult to handle, but they are also 
impossible to predict.  Thus, one important step to preventing XSS attacks is for 
web browsers to change to only invoke scripts in standardized cases. 
As stated in Chapter 3.1, our approach expects web applications to construct test 
web pages mimicking the context in which the user input will be embedded.  
Thus, our approach is not particularly simple to use on its own and may be prone 
to human error from the web developer.  A solution to this problem may be to 
package the parser executable with web development libraries that interface with 
the executable.  For instance, web developers could import a PHP function for the 
23 
 
parser that does three things given the user input and an enumerated value 
indicating the context in which the user input will be used.  Firstly, it 
automatically generates the prefix and suffix for the input.  Secondly, it runs the 
input through the parser, encapsulating the call to exec.  Finally, it returns a value 
for “safe” and a value for “unsafe” depending on the parser's exit status.  Such a 
function should make the parser more convenient to use and the contexts in which 
user input has been validated easier to track.  For an example of such a library, see 
Appendix F. 
Additionally, our approach requires that user input be scanned for every context 
in which it's used.  This is because text that is syntactically correct and safe in one 
context (such as between HTML "div" tags) may not be syntactically correct or 
safe in another context (such as inside the open tag of an HTML "div" element).  
Thus, validating input is not as simple as scanning it before storing it in a database 
or scanning input once and then using it in multiple locations.  The only safe 
solution would be to validate input before each of its uses, or to track the contexts 
in which the input will be used and validate the input once for each context before 
use. 
4.2 Test Results 
Our approach was tested by implementing an SFH4 parser and running generic 
test cases against it, including cases that should pass and cases that should fail.  
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The 5 cases that should pass, based on the HTML 4.01 Strict DTD, tested the 
parser's acceptance of valid HTML, complex nesting, and variations in use of 
attributes.  The 16 cases that should fail, based on OWASP's filter evasion cheat 
sheet, tested the parser's rejection of malformed HTML and known XSS attack 
vectors.  Out of the 21 test cases, our implementation accepted 4 out of the 5 it 
should have accepted, and rejected all 16 it should have rejected.  For the tests run 
and the results, see Table 1. 
Table 1: Test Results 
 
Test # Expectation Result Description
1 ACCEPT ACCEPT Simple case (doctype, html; no attributes)
2 ACCEPT ACCEPT Nesting
3 ACCEPT ACCEPT Attributes
4 ACCEPT REJECT UTF-8 encoding, simple case
5 ACCEPT ACCEPT Permit PCDATA inside appropriate elements
6 REJECT REJECT No doctype (html, head, title)
7 REJECT REJECT Improper parent element (html, head, title, div)
8 REJECT REJECT Custom element (html, head, title, body, xss)
9 REJECT REJECT Attributes with no value
10 REJECT REJECT Stray cdata within tags (html, cdata, head, title)
11 REJECT REJECT Improperly closed attribute values
12 REJECT REJECT Script tags
13 REJECT REJECT Javascript in img src
14 REJECT REJECT On* attributes
15 REJECT REJECT Frame tags
16 REJECT REJECT Style element
17 REJECT REJECT style attribute
18 REJECT REJECT Meta-linked css file
19 REJECT REJECT Link-linked css file
20 REJECT REJECT Redirect 302
21 REJECT REJECT Custom attribute
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In our implementation's failed test case, it rejected safe input which was encoded 
in UTF-8 rather than ASCII.  This false positive was expected because our 
implementation did not take into account the various character encodings.  To 
address this, the parser could have taken the character encoding as an argument to 
then read and compare text accordingly.  In the case of character encodings that 
permit more characters than ASCII, the token definitions would need expanded to 
permit the extra characters. 
The performance of our implementation was tested by running each of the 
verification tests and a large input test 20 times.  The large input test contained 
2.8KB of safe data inside valid HTML.  The system used to perform testing had 
an 8-core Intel(R) Xeon(TM) CPU at 2.80GHz per core, and 8059128 kB of 
memory.  The tests ran with a mean of 0.022 seconds per set of 22 tests with a 
variance of 0.004 seconds. 
4.3 Future Work 
The most obvious future work for this project is to extend SFH4 to HTML 5.  
This task could be accomplished simply by creating a DTD for HTML 5, 
modifying it to exclude unsafe elements and attributes, and then running the DTD 
through the process used in this project just the same as was done with the HTML 
4.01 Strict DTD for SFH4.  A similar approach might also be used to make a 
26 
 
Script-Free Cascading Style Sheets parser.  We can also extend SFH4 to correct 
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 : Scanner Configuration File Appendix A
The MSL script that generates the token definitions for Flex copies this file 






#define DEBUG 0 
 
bool _inOpenTag = false; 
bool _inQuote = false; 








NUM   [0-9] 
ALPHA  [a-zA-z] 
ALNUM  {ALPHA}|{NUM} 
SPACE  " "|"\t"|"\r"|"\n" 
ID   {ALPHA}{ALNUM}* 
PCDATA   ({ALNUM}|{SYMBOL})({SPACE}*{ALNUM}|{SPACE}*{SYMBOL})* 
URI   ("http://"|"https://"|"/"|"./")({ALNUM}|{SYMBOL})* 




    printDebug("DOCTYPE"); 
    return DOCTYPE; 
   } 
"<"   { 
    printDebug("LT"); 
    _inOpenTag = true; 
    return '<'; 
   } 
">"   { 
    printDebug("GT"); 
    _inOpenTag = false; 
    return '>'; 
   } 
{URI}  { 
    if (_lastID == SRCID) { 
     _lastID = ERROR; 
     printDebug("URI"); 
     return URI; 
    } 
    else { 
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     REJECT; 
    } 
   } 
{PCDATA} { 
    if (_inQuote || !_inOpenTag) { printDebug("PCDATA"); 
return PCDATA; } 
    else {  
     //printf("Reject CDATA\n");  
     REJECT; 
    } 
   } 
{ID}  { 
    if (_inQuote) {  
     //printf("Reject ID\n"); 
     REJECT; 
    } else { 
     printDebug("ID"); 
     _lastID = parseID(); 
     return _lastID; 
    } 
   } 
"\""  { 
    _inQuote = ! _inQuote; 
    printDebug("\""); 
    return 34; 
   } 
    
"="   {  
    printDebug("="); 
    if (_inOpenTag) { return '='; } 
    else { REJECT; } 
   } 
"/"   {  
    printDebug("/"); 
    if (_inOpenTag) { return '/'; } 
    else { REJECT; } 
   } 
{SPACE}  ; 
.   { 
    printDebug("ERROR"); 
    return ERROR; 
   } 
%% 
void printDebug(char* token) { 
 if (DEBUG) { 
  printf("%s: %s\n",token,yytext); 
 } 
} 
void upperString(char* in) { 
 int pos = 0; 
 for (pos = 0; in[pos] != '\0'; pos++) { 





 : Grammar Configuration Files Appendix B
The MSL script that generates the grammar definition effectively procedurally 
generates token definitions, copies the first file verbatim, procedurally generates 














START : DOCTYPE HTML 
 
%% 





int main (void) { 





 : Token Definitions Appendix C
The following is the input to Flex, which generates a token scanner.  The 







#define DEBUG 0 
 
bool _inOpenTag = false; 
bool _inQuote = false; 








NUM   [0-9] 
ALPHA  [a-zA-z] 
ALNUM  {ALPHA}|{NUM} 
SPACE  " "|"\t"|"\r"|"\n" 
ID   {ALPHA}{ALNUM}* 
PCDATA   ({ALNUM}|{SYMBOL})({SPACE}*{ALNUM}|{SPACE}*{SYMBOL})* 
URI   ("http://"|"https://"|"/"|"./")({ALNUM}|{SYMBOL})* 
DOCTYPE  "<!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC \"-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.01 Transitional//EN\">" 
%% 
{DOCTYPE} { 
    printDebug("DOCTYPE"); 
    return DOCTYPE; 
   } 
"<"   { 
    printDebug("LT"); 
    _inOpenTag = true; 
    return '<'; 
   } 
">"   { 
    printDebug("GT"); 
    _inOpenTag = false; 
    return '>'; 
   } 
{URI}  { 
    if (_lastID == SRCID) { 
     _lastID = ERROR; 
     printDebug("URI"); 
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     return URI; 
    } 
    else { 
     REJECT; 
    } 
   } 
{PCDATA} { 
    if (_inQuote || !_inOpenTag) { printDebug("PCDATA"); 
return PCDATA; } 
    else {  
     //printf("Reject CDATA\n");  
     REJECT; 
    } 
   } 
{ID}  { 
    if (_inQuote) {  
     //printf("Reject ID\n"); 
     REJECT; 
    } else { 
     printDebug("ID"); 
     _lastID = parseID(); 
     return _lastID; 
    } 
   } 
"\""  { 
    _inQuote = ! _inQuote; 
    printDebug("\""); 
    return 34; 
   } 
    
"="   {  
    printDebug("="); 
    if (_inOpenTag) { return '='; } 
    else { REJECT; } 
   } 
"/"   {  
    printDebug("/"); 
    if (_inOpenTag) { return '/'; } 
    else { REJECT; } 
   } 
{SPACE}  ; 
.   { 
    printDebug("ERROR"); 
    return ERROR; 
   } 
%% 
void printDebug(char* token) { 
 if (DEBUG) { 
  printf("%s: %s\n",token,yytext); 
 } 
} 
void upperString(char* in) { 
 int pos = 0; 
 for (pos = 0; in[pos] != '\0'; pos++) { 
  in[pos] = toupper(in[pos]); 
 } 
} 
int parseID() { 
 upperString(yytext); 
 if (strcmp(yytext,"TT") == 0) return TTID; else 
 if (strcmp(yytext,"I") == 0) return IID; else 
(…) 
 if (strcmp(yytext,"DIR") == 0) return DIRID; else 
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 : Grammar Definition Appendix D
The following is the input to Bison, which produces the parser.  The token 
definitions and reproduction rules are abbreviated to save space, given that they 


















START : DOCTYPE HTML 
HTMLATTRIBUTES : HTMLATTRIBUTES DIRID '=' '\"' PCDATA '"' | HTMLATTRIBUTES LANGID 
'=' '\"' PCDATA '"' | ; 
NOSCRIPTATTRIBUTES : NOSCRIPTATTRIBUTES DIRID '=' '\"' PCDATA '"' | 
NOSCRIPTATTRIBUTES LANGID '=' '\"' PCDATA '"' | NOSCRIPTATTRIBUTES TITLEID '=' 
'\"' PCDATA '"' | NOSCRIPTATTRIBUTES CLASSID '=' '\"' PCDATA '"' | 
NOSCRIPTATTRIBUTES IDID '=' '\"' PCDATA '"' | ; 
(…) 
TTATTRIBUTES : TTATTRIBUTES DIRID '=' '\"' PCDATA '"' | TTATTRIBUTES LANGID '=' 
'\"' PCDATA '"' | TTATTRIBUTES TITLEID '=' '\"' PCDATA '"' | TTATTRIBUTES CLASSID 
'=' '\"' PCDATA '"' | TTATTRIBUTES IDID '=' '\"' PCDATA '"' | ; 
HTML : '<' HTMLID HTMLATTRIBUTES '>' HTMLSUBELEMENTS '<' '/' HTMLID '>' ; 
HTMLSUBELEMENTS : HTMLSUBELEMENTS HEAD | HTMLSUBELEMENTS BODY | ; 
NOSCRIPT : '<' NOSCRIPTID NOSCRIPTATTRIBUTES '>' NOSCRIPTSUBELEMENTS '<' '/' 
NOSCRIPTID '>' ; 
NOSCRIPTSUBELEMENTS : NOSCRIPTSUBELEMENTS P | NOSCRIPTSUBELEMENTS H1 | 
NOSCRIPTSUBELEMENTS H2 | NOSCRIPTSUBELEMENTS H3 | NOSCRIPTSUBELEMENTS H4 | 
NOSCRIPTSUBELEMENTS H5 | NOSCRIPTSUBELEMENTS H6 | NOSCRIPTSUBELEMENTS UL | 
NOSCRIPTSUBELEMENTS OL | NOSCRIPTSUBELEMENTS PRE | NOSCRIPTSUBELEMENTS DL | 
NOSCRIPTSUBELEMENTS DIV | NOSCRIPTSUBELEMENTS NOSCRIPT | NOSCRIPTSUBELEMENTS 
BLOCKQUOTE | NOSCRIPTSUBELEMENTS FORM | NOSCRIPTSUBELEMENTS HR | 
NOSCRIPTSUBELEMENTS TABLE | NOSCRIPTSUBELEMENTS FIELDSET | NOSCRIPTSUBELEMENTS 
ADDRESS | ; 
(…) 
TTSUBELEMENTS : TTSUBELEMENTS PCDATA | TTSUBELEMENTS TT | TTSUBELEMENTS I | 
TTSUBELEMENTS B | TTSUBELEMENTS BIG | TTSUBELEMENTS SMALL | TTSUBELEMENTS EM | 
TTSUBELEMENTS STRONG | TTSUBELEMENTS DFN | TTSUBELEMENTS CODE | TTSUBELEMENTS SAMP 
| TTSUBELEMENTS KBD | TTSUBELEMENTS VAR | TTSUBELEMENTS CITE | TTSUBELEMENTS ABBR 
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| TTSUBELEMENTS ACRONYM | TTSUBELEMENTS A | TTSUBELEMENTS IMG | TTSUBELEMENTS BR | 
TTSUBELEMENTS MAP | TTSUBELEMENTS Q | TTSUBELEMENTS SUB | TTSUBELEMENTS SUP | 
TTSUBELEMENTS SPAN | TTSUBELEMENTS BDO | TTSUBELEMENTS INPUT | TTSUBELEMENTS 
SELECT | TTSUBELEMENTS TEXTAREA | TTSUBELEMENTS LABEL | TTSUBELEMENTS BUTTON | ; 
%% 





int main (void) { 




 : MSL Scripts Appendix E
Below are the entirety of the MSL scripts used in SFH4. 
;-----STEP 1----- 
removeComments { 
  var %line $1 
 
  var %result 
 
  while (%line != $null) { 
    var %pos1 $pos(%line,--,1) 
    var %pos2 $pos(%line,--,2) 
 
    if (%pos1 == $null) { 
      var %result %result $+ %line 
      var %line $null 
    } 
    elseif (%pos2 == $null) { 
      var %result %result $+ $left(%line,$calc(%pos1 - 1)) 
      var %line $null 
    } 
    else { 
      var %result %result $+ $left(%line,$calc(%pos1 - 1)) 
      var %line $right(%line,$calc(%pos2 * -1 - 1)) 
    } 
  } 
 




  tokenize 32 $1- 
 
  if ($1 == <!ATTLIST) { 
    var %buffer $2 , $+ $left($3-,-1) 
  }  
  elseif ($1 == <!ELEMENT) { 
    var %buffer $2 , $+ $left($5-,-1) 
  } 
  elseif ($1 == <!ENTITY) { 
    var %buffer $3 , $+ $left($4-,-1) 
  } 




  var %inFile $1 
  var %entityOut $2 
  var %attributeOut $3 
  var %elementOut $4 
 




  write -c %entityOut 
  write -c %attributeOut 
  write -c %elementOut 
 
  var %inItem 0 
  var %buffer 
  var %outFile $null 
 
  var %curLine 1 
  var %totalLines $lines(%inFile) 
  while (%curLine <= %totalLines) { 
    var %line $read(%inFile,n,%curLine) 
 
    if (<!* iswm %line) { 
      %inItem = 1 
      if (ENTITY isin $gettok(%line,1,32)) { 
        var %outFile %entityOut 
      } 
      elseif (ATTLIST isin $gettok(%line,1,32)) { 
        var %outFile %attributeOut 
      } 
      elseif (ELEMENT isin $gettok(%line,1,32)) { 
        var %outFile %elementOut 
      } 
      else { 
        var %outFile $null 
      } 
    } 
    if (%inItem == 1) { 
      %buffer = %buffer %line 
    } 
    if (*> iswm %line) { 
      if (%outFile) { 
        var %buffer $removeComments(%buffer) 
        var %buffer $xmlToCsv(%buffer) 
        write %outFile %buffer 
        var %outFile $null 
      } 
      %inItem = 0 
      %buffer = $null 
    } 
    %curLine = %curLine + 1 





  var %line $1 
 
  if (*%*;* iswm %line) { 
    return $true 
  } 




  var %line $1 
  var %num $2 
 
  if (%num > 0) { 
    var %pos1 $pos(%line,%,%num) 




    var %pos2 $pos(%substr,$chr(59)%num) 
    if (%pos2 == $null) { 
      return $false 
    } 
    return $mid(%line,$calc(%pos1 + 1),$calc(%pos2 - 1)) 




  var %inFile $1 
  var %tempFile $2 
  var %outFile $3 
 
  write -c %outFile 
  write -c %tempFile 
 
  var %iterations 1 
  var %replacements 1 
  var %writingToOutFile $true 
  while (%replacements > 0) { 
    var %replacements 0 
 
    var %lines $lines(%inFile) 
    var %s 1 
 
    while (%s <= %lines) { 
      var %line $read(%inFile,n,%s) 
      var %name hgd.dtd 
 
      if (*%*;* iswm %line) { 
        var %replacements 1 
 
        var %variable $findVariable(%line,1) 
        var %formattedVariable $+(%,%variable,$chr(59)) 
        var %rawLookup $read(%inFile,ns,%variable) 
        var %lookup $left($right(%rawLookup,-2),-1) 
        var %replacement $replace(%line,%formattedVariable,%lookup) 
 
        write %tempFile %replacement 
      } 
      else { 
        write %tempFile %line 
      } 
      inc %s 
    } 
    .remove %outFile 
    .rename %tempFile %outFile 
    var %inFile %outFile 
 
    inc %iterations 
    if (%iterations == 15) { 
      echo -s Halted; non-terminating loop 
      halt 
    } 





  var %inFile $1 
  var %refFile $2 




  write -c %outFile 
 
  var %s 1 
  var %lines $lines(%inFile) 
  while (%s <= %lines) { 
    var %line $read(%inFile,n,%s) 
 
    while (*%*;* iswm %line) { 
      var %variable $findVariable(%line,1) 
      var %formattedVariable $+(%,%variable,$chr(59)) 
      var %rawLookup $read(%refFile,ns,%variable) 
      var %lookup $left($right(%rawLookup,-2),-1) 
      var %line $replace(%line,%formattedVariable,%lookup) 
    } 
    var %line $replace(%line,$chr(32),!) 
    tokenize 44 %line 
 
    var %start $remove($1,$chr(40),$chr(41),!) 
    var %value $replacex($2-,$chr(32),$chr(124),!,$chr(32)) 
    var %left $null 
    var %right $null 
 
    var %cp $pos(%value,$chr(41),0) 
    if (%cp == 2) { 
      if ($pos(%value,$chr(41),1) < $pos(%value,$chr(40),2)) { 
        var %cp $pos(%value,$chr(41),1) 
      } 
      else { 
        var %cp $pos(%value,$chr(41),2) 
      } 
      inc %cp 
    } 
    elseif (%cp == 1) { 
      var %cp $calc( $pos(%value,$chr(41),1) + 1) 
    } 
    else { 
      var %cp $len(%value) 
    } 
 
    var %left $remove($left(%value,%cp),$chr(40),$chr(41),*,+,?,$chr(35),$chr(32)) 
    var %left $replace(%left,&,|) 
    var %rightc $calc($len(%value) - %cp) 
    if (%rightc > 0) { 
      var %right 
$remove($right(%value,%rightc),$chr(40),$chr(41),*,?,$chr(35),$chr(32)) 
      var %symbol $left(%right,1) 
      var %right $right(%right,-1) 
      var %p 1 
      var %tot $numtok(%right,124) 
      while (%p <= %tot) { 
        var %tok $gettok(%right,%p,124) 
        if (%symbol == +) { 
          var %left $+(%left,|,%tok) 
        } 
        elseif (%symbol == -) { 
          var %left $remtok(%left,%tok,1,124) 
        } 
        inc %p 
      } 
    } 
    var %p 1 
    var %tot $numtok(%start,124) 
    while (%p <= %tot) { 
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      var %line $gettok(%start,%p,124) $+ , $+ %left 
      write %outFile %line 
      inc %p 
    } 
    inc %s 





  var %right $1- 
 
  var %op $chr(40) 
  var %cp $chr(41) 
 
  var %buffer 
  var %p 1 
  var %tot $numtok(%right,32) 
  var %ttype 1 
  var %name 
  var %valstart 
  var %val 
  var %wait $false 
  while (%p <= %tot) { 
    var %tok $gettok(%right,%p,32) 
    if (%ttype == 1) { 
      var %name %tok 
      inc %ttype 
      var %valstart $calc(%p + 1) 
    } 
    elseif (%ttype == 2) { 
      if ($+(%op,*) iswm %tok) { 
        var %wait $true 
      } 
      if ($+(*,%cp) iswm %tok) { 
        var %wait $false 
      } 
      if (!%wait) { 
        var %val $gettok(%right,$+(%valstart,-,%p),32) 
        ;Overwriting %val for simplicity of Flex/Bison parsing.  Prefix val with 
"Keep:" to keep it 
        if (keep:* iswm %val) { 
          var %val $gettok(%val,2,58) 
        } 
        else { 
          var %val PCDATA 
        } 
        var %buffer %buffer $+ %name %val $+ $chr(44) 
        inc %ttype 
      } 
    } 
    elseif (%ttype == 3) { 
      var %ttype 1 
    } 
    else { 
      echo -s Error: Unknown token index 
      halt 
    } 
 
    inc %p 
  } 






  var %inFile $1 
  var %refFile $2 
  var %outFile $3 
 
  var %comma $chr(44) 
  var %op $chr(40) 
  var %cp $chr(41) 
 
  write -c %outFile 
 
  var %s 1 
  var %lines $lines(%inFile) 
  while (%s <= %lines) { 
    var %line $read(%inFile,n,%s) 
 
    ;Evaluate entities 
    while (*%*;* iswm %line) { 
      var %variable $findVariable(%line,1) 
      var %formattedVariable $+(%,%variable,$chr(59)) 
      var %rawLookup $read(%refFile,ns,%variable) 
      var %lookup $left($right(%rawLookup,-2),-1) 
      var %line $replace(%line,%formattedVariable,%lookup) 
    } 
    var %left $remove($gettok(%line,1,44),$chr(32),$chr(40),$chr(41)) 
    var %right $simplifyAttributes($gettok(%line,2-,44)) 
 
    var %tot $numtok(%left,124) 
    var %p 1 
    while (%p <= %tot) { 
      var %tok $gettok(%left,%p,124) 
      var %line $left($+(%tok,$chr(44),%right),-1) 
      var %line $replace(%line,$+($chr(32),%comma,$chr(32)),%comma) 
 
      write %outFile %line 
      inc %p 
    } 
 
    inc %s 





  var %line $1 
  var %elementsList $2 
 
  var %element $gettok(%line,1,44) 
  if ($istok(%elementsList,%element,44)) { 
    return $null 
  } 
  else { 
    var %subs $gettok(%line,2,44) 
 
    var %n $numtok(%elementslist,44) 
    while (%n > 0) { 
      var %rmtok $gettok(%elementsList,%n,44) 
      var %subs $remtok(%subs,%rmtok,0,124) 
 
      dec %n 
    } 
    return %element $+ , $+ %subs 
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  var %line $1 
  var %attributesList $2 
  var %elementsList $3 
 
  var %element $gettok(%line,1,44) 
  if ($istok(%elementsList,%element,44)) { 
    return $null 
  } 
  else { 
    var %attributes $gettok(%line,2-,44) 
 
    var %n $numtok(%attributesList,44) 
    while (%n > 0) { 
      var %rmtok $gettok(%attributesList,%n,44) 
      var %attributes $remtok(%attributes,%rmtok,0,44) 
      dec %n 
    } 
    return %element $+ , $+ %attributes 




  var %attributesFile $1 
  var %element $2 
  var %attribute $3 
  var %oldValue $4 
  var %newValue $5 
 
  var %line $read(%attributesFile,nw,$+(%element,$chr(44),*)) 
  var %n $readn 
  if (%n < 1) { halt } 
 
  var %atts $gettok(%line,2-,44) 
  var %atts $remtok(%atts,%attribute %oldValue,0,44) 
  var %atts $addtok(%atts,%attribute %newValue,44) 
 
  var %line %element $+ $chr(44) $+ %atts 
 




  ;INPUT VARIABLES 
  var %elementsFile $1 
  var %attributesFile $2 
  var %elementsList $3 
  var %attributesList $4 
 
  var %bar $chr(124) 
 
  ;ELEMENTS FILE 
  var %p $lines(%elementsFile) 
  while (%p > 0) { 
    var %line $read(%elementsFile,n,%p) 
    var %line $filterElements(%line,%elementsList) 
    if (%line == $null) { 
      write -dl $+ %p %elementsFile 
    } 
    else { 
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      write -l $+ %p %elementsFile %line 
    } 
    dec %p 
  } 
 
  ;ATTRIBUTES FILE 
  var %p $lines(%attributesFile) 
  while (%p > 0) { 
    var %line $read(%attributesFile,n,%p) 
    var %line $filterAttributes(%line,%attributesList,%elementsList) 
    if (%line == $null) { 
      write -dl $+ %p %attributesFile 
    } 
    else { 
      write -l $+ %p %attributesFile %line 
    } 
    dec %p   






  ;GOALS 
  ;1) enumerate attribute IDs 
  ;2) write attribute rewrites in Bison 
 
  ;INPUT VARIABLES 
  var %line $1 
  var %idList $2 
  var %writeCmd $3 
 
  ;STRING MANIPULATION VARIABLES 
  var %bar $chr(124) 
  var %element $gettok(%line,1,44) 
  var %elementAttributes $+(%element,ATTRIBUTES) : 
 
  ;ITERATE OVER ATTRIBUTE DECLARATIONS 
  var %s $numtok(%line,44) 
  while (%s > 1) { 
    ;STRING MANIPULATION VARIABLES 
    var %tok $gettok(%line,%s,44) 
    tokenize 32 %tok 
    var %upper $remove($upper($1),-) 
    var %val $2 
    var %id %upper $+ ID 
 
    ;Achieves Goal 1: ENUMERATE IDS 
    var %idList $addtok(%idList,%upper,44) 
 
    ;Achieves Goal 2: ATTRIBUTE DECLARATIONS 
    var %elementAttributes %elementAttributes $+(%element,ATTRIBUTES) %id '=' '\"' 
%val '"' %bar 
 
    dec %s 
  } 
  ;Achieves Goal 2: ATTRIBUTE DECLARATIONS 
  %writeCmd %elementAttributes ; 
 






  ;GOALS: 
  ;1) enumerate element IDs 
  ;2) write subelements rewrites in Bison 
  ;3) write element declaration rewrites in Bison 
 
  ;INPUT VARIABLES 
  var %line $1 
  var %idList $2 
  var %writeCmd $3 
 
  ;STRING MANIPULATION VARIABLES 
  var %bar $chr(124) 
  var %element $remove($gettok(%line,1,44),$chr(32)) 
  var %upper $upper(%element) 
  var %id $remove($+(%upper,ID),-) 
  var %sub $remove($gettok(%line,2,44),$chr(32)) 
  var %sub $replace(%sub,PCDATA,CDATA,CDATA,PCDATA) 
  var %text-sub $+(%upper,SUBELEMENTS) 
  var %text-att $+(%upper,ATTRIBUTES) 
 
  ;SETUP FOR CLOSE TAGS 
  var %close $null 
  if (%sub != EMPTY) { 
    var %close '<' '/' %id '>' 
  } 
  else { 
    var %sub $null 
  } 
 
  ;Achieves Goal 3: ELEMENT DECLARATION 
  %writeCmd %upper : '<' %id %text-att '>' $iif(%sub,%text-sub %close,) ; 
 
  ;Achieves Goal 2: SUBELEMENT DECLARATION 
  if (%sub) { 
    %writeCmd %text-sub : %text-sub $replace(%sub,%bar,$+($chr(32),%bar %text-
sub,$chr(32))) %bar ; 
  } 
 
  ;Achieves Goal 1: ID DECLARATION 




  ;INPUT VARIABLES 
  var %elementsFile $1 
  var %attributesFile $2 
  var %bisonPrefix $3 
  var %bisonSuffix $4 
  var %flexPrefix $5 
  var %bisonOut $6 
  var %flexOut $7 
  var %tempFile $8 
 
  ;GOALS: 
  ;1) Attribute ID tokens in Bison 
  ;2) Element ID tokens in Bison 
  ;3) Element declaration rewrites in Bison 
  ;4) Attribute rewrites in Bison 
  ;5) Subelements rewrites in Bison 
  ;6) parseID() function in Flex 
 
  ;STRING MANIPULATION VARIABLES 
  var %nl $chr(10) 
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  var %per $chr(37) 
  var %bar $chr(124) 
  var %tab $chr(9) 
 
  ;CLEAR OUTPUT FILES 
  write -c %bisonOut 
  write -c %flexOut 
  write -c %tempFile 
 
  ;SET STARTING CONTENT FOR OUTPUT FILES 
  if ($isFile(%bisonPrefix)) { 
    .copy -o %bisonPrefix %bisonOut 
  } 
  if ($isFile(%flexPrefix)) { 
    .copy -o %flexPrefix %flexOut 
  } 
 
  ;PARSE ATTRIBUTES FILE 
  var %idList 
  var %t $lines(%attributesFile) 
  while (%t > 0) { 
    var %line $read(%attributesFile,n,%t) 
 
    ;Achives Goals 1 AND 4 
    var %idList $parseAttributesFile(%line,%idList,write %tempFile) 
 
    dec %t 
  } 
 
  ;PARSE SUBELEMENTS FILE 
  var %t $lines(%elementsFile) 
  while (%t > 0) { 
    var %line $read(%elementsFile,n,%t) 
 
    ;Achieves Goals 2, 3, AND 5 
    var %idList $parseElementsFile(%line,%idList,write %tempFile) 
 
    dec %t 
  } 
 
  ;Achieves goals 1, 2, AND 6 
  write %flexOut int parseID() $chr(123) 
  write %flexOut %tab $+ upperString(yytext); 
 
  ;Parse through collected attributes 
  var %tot $numtok(%idList,44) 
  while (%tot > 0) { 
    var %upper $gettok(%idList,%tot,44) 
    var %id %upper $+ ID 
 
    ;Bison section: Attribute tokens 
    write -il1 %bisonOut $+(%per,token) %id 
 
    ;Flex section: parseAttribute() body 
    write %flexOut %tab $+ if (strcmp(yytext," $+ %upper $+ ") == 0) return %id $+ 
; else 
 
    dec %tot 
  } 
  write %flexOut %tab $+ return ERROR; 
  write %flexOut $chr(125) %nl %nl 
 
  .copy -a %tempFile %bisonOut 
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  ;Note: If %directory doesn't exist, mIRC will return errors 
  var %directory $mircdir $+ sfh/ 
  var %dtd $+(%directory,strict.dtd) 
  var %tempFile $+(%directory,temp.txt) 
 
  var %entitiesCSV $+(%directory,sfh.entities.csv) 
  var %elementsCSV $+(%directory,sfh.elements.csv) 
  var %attributesCSV $+(%directory,sfh.attributes.csv) 
 
  var %evaluatedEntities $+(%directory,sfh.entitiesEvaluated.csv) 
  var %evaluatedAttributes $+(%directory,sfh.attributesEvaluated.csv) 
  var %evaluatedElements $+(%directory,sfh.elementsEvaluated.csv) 
 
  var %elementsList $replace(base link meta object param script 
style,$chr(32),$chr(44)) 
  var %attributesList onclick PCDATA,ondblclick PCDATA,onmousedown 
PCDATA,onmouseup PCDATA,onmouseover PCDATA,onmousemove PCDATA,onmouseout 
PCDATA,onkeypress PCDATA,onkeydown PCDATA,onkeyup PCDATA,action PCDATA,profile 
PCDATA,onfocus PCDATA,onblur PCDATA,style PCDATA 
 
  var %bisonPrefix $+(%directory,sfh.preBison.txt) 
  var %bisonSuffix $+(%directory,sfh.postBison.txt) 
  var %flexPrefix $+(%directory,sfh.preFlex.txt) 
  var %bisonOut $+(%directory,sfh.y) 
  var %flexOut $+(%directory,sfh.l) 
 
  var %totalTime $ctime 
 
  echo -s Starting Step 1 
  var %time $ctime 
  noop $parseItems(%dtd,%entitiesCSV,%attributesCSV,%elementsCSV) 
  var %duration $calc($ctime - %time) 
  echo -s Done! $duration(%duration) 
 
  echo -s Starting Step 2 
  var %time $ctime 
  noop $evaluateEntities(%entitiesCSV,%tempFile,%evaluatedEntities) 
  var %duration $calc($ctime - %time) 
  echo -s Done! $duration(%duration) 
 
  echo -s Starting Step 3 
  var %time $ctime 
  noop $evaluateElements(%elementsCSV,%evaluatedEntities,%evaluatedElements) 
  var %duration $calc($ctime - %time) 
  echo -s Done! $duration(%duration) 
 
  echo -s Starting Step 4 
  var %time $ctime 
  noop $evaluateAttributes(%attributesCSV,%evaluatedEntities,%evaluatedAttributes) 
  var %duration $calc($ctime - %time) 
  echo -s Done! $duration(%duration) 
 
  echo -s Starting Step 5 
  var %time $ctime 
  noop 
$removeItems(%evaluatedElements,%evaluatedAttributes,%elementsList,%attributesList
) 
  noop $redefineElement(%evaluatedAttributes,IMG,src,PCDATA,URI) 
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  var %duration $calc($ctime - %time) 
  echo -s Done! $duration(%duration) 
 
  echo -s Starting Step 6 
  var %time $ctime 
  noop 
$makeInputFiles(%evaluatedElements,%evaluatedAttributes,%bisonPrefix,%bisonSuffix,
%flexPrefix,%bisonOut,%flexOut,%tempFile) 
  var %duration $calc($ctime - %time) 
  echo -s Done! $duration(%duration) 
 
  var %duration $calc($ctime - %totalTime) 




  var %asc $asc($1) 
  if ((( %asc >= $asc(A) ) && ( %asc <= $asc(Z) ) ) || (( %asc >= $asc(a) ) && ( 
%asc <= $asc(z) ))) { 
    return $true 
  } 




 : Sample PHP Class Appendix F
This is a sample PHP class to interface with the SFH4 parser.  The code includes 
comments explaining how methods should be used. 
<?php 
class SFHscanner { 
    // Private member variables for the executable file and the buffer file for 
    //   input sent to the scanner. 
    private $program_file; 
    private $buffer_file; 
     
    // Input: 
    //   $program_file: The location of the scanner executable 
    //   $buffer_file: The location of a file to use as the scanner's input buffer 
    function __construct($program_file, $buffer_file) { 
        $this->program_file = $program_file; 
        $this->buffer_file = $buffer_file; 
    } 
 
    // Summary: Runs $input through the SFH scanner with no prior processing 
    // Input: 
    //   $input: The input to scan 
    // Returns: true if pass, false if reject 
    // 
    public function raw_scan($input) { 
        $returned = ""; 
        $output = ""; 
        $operator = " "; 
 
        file_put_contents($this->buffer_file, $input); 
        $argument = $this->buffer_file; 
        $operator = " < "; 
        $cmd = $this->program_file.$operator.$argument; 
 
        $result = exec($cmd, $output, $returned); 
        if($returned == 0) { 
            $returned = true; 
        } else { 
            $returned = false; 
        } 
        return $returned; 
    } 
     
    // Summary: Runs $input through SFH scanner after surrounding it with 
    //   context as specified in $nest_array 
    // Input: 
    //   $input: The input to scan 
    //   $nest_array: The array must be number-indexed, starting at 0 and 
    //     increasing sequentially.  The elements must be tag names in 
    //     descending order of nesting.  That is, the first item should be 
    //     'HTML' followed by the next tag down, and so on. 
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    // Returns: true if test page passes, else false 
    public function context_scan($raw_input, $nest_array) { 
        $dtd = '<!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.01 Transitional//EN">'; 
        $prefix = ''; 
        $suffix = ''; 
        for ($i = count($nest_array); $i > 0; $i--) { 
            $item = $nest_array[$i - 1]; 
            if ($item != NULL) { 
                $prefix = '<'.$item.'>'.$prefix; 
                $suffix .= '</'.$item.'>'; 
            } 
        } 
        $input = $dtd.$prefix.$raw_input.$suffix; 
        return $this->raw_scan($input); 
    } 
} 
?> 
